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In this paper we connect open-ended development, authority, agency, and motivation
through (1) an analysis of the demands of existing in a complex world and (2)
environmental appraisal in terms of affordance content and the complexity to select
appropriate behavior. We do this by identifying a coherent core from a wide range of
contributing fields. Open-ended development is a structured three-step process in which
the agent first learns to master the body and then aims to make the mind into a reliable
tool. Preconditioned on success in step two, step three aims to effectively co-create
an optimal living environment. We argue that these steps correspond to right-left-right
hemispheric dominance, where the left hemisphere specializes in control and the right
hemisphere in exploration. Control (e.g., problem solving) requires a closed and stable
world that must be maintained by external authorities or, in step three, by the right
hemisphere acting as internal authority. The three-step progression therefore corresponds
to increasing autonomy and agency. Depending on how we appraise the environment, we
formulate four qualitatively different motivational states: submission, control, exploration,
and consolidation. Each of these four motivational states has associated reward signals
of which the last three—successful control, discovery of novelty, and establishing
new relations—form an open-ended development loop that, the more it is executed,
helps the agent to become progressively more agentic and more able to co-create a
pleasant-to-live-in world. We conclude that for autonomy to arise, the agent must exist
in a (broad) transition region between order and disorder in which both danger and
opportunity (and with that open-ended development and motivation) are defined. We
conclude that a research agenda for artificial cognitive system research should include
open-ended development through intrinsic motivations and ascribing more prominence to
right hemispheric strengths.
Keywords: motivation, agency, autonomy, open-ended development, co-creation, authority, complexity,
lateralization
INTRODUCTION
In this theoretical paper we aim to unify a number of complemen-
tary and highly consistent results from a wide range of scientific
domains that all pertain to “learning to cope autonomously with
the challenges of an open environment.” We will frame these
results in terms of agency and autonomy development. In the
final section we will formulate what we call the “open-ended
development loop” (Figure 5) as a main and productive synthesis
for artificial cognitive system research and behavioral sciences in
general.
In our efforts we benefitted from results and insights from
life-span research, personality development, emotion theory, psy-
choanalysis, motivation research, brain lateralization, political
psychology, soundscape research, complexity theory, and even
early Chinese philosophy. In addition, although in this paper
less prominent, we benefited from moral psychology, epistemo-
logical development, and education research. While this may
seem an unnecessary wide range of scientific domains to address
the call-topic of “open-ended development driven by intrinsic
motivations” we argue that both the concepts of “open-ended
development” and “motivation” are not just cognitive functions,
but cognitive foundations: without motivation there would be no
activity and no agency.
As cognitive foundations, “motivation” and “open-ended
development” shape and constrain many facets of cognition. As
such, insights from all specialisms of the cognitive sciences in the
broadest sense, and in particular those domains directly related to
open environments, may contribute with novel perspectives on
foundational principles. We will outline that open-ended devel-
opment and motivation are intimately related with concepts such
as agency, mood, behavior, and action selection, brain lateral-
ization, appraisal, safety, and complexity. In addition we will
introduce the terms “authority” (defined as the capacity to create,
maintain, and influence living environments), and “co-creation”
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(defined as the ability to work with the inherent dynamics of the
world instead of suppressing and controlling it) as fundamental
concepts for understanding agency and cognition.
Since we derive from many domains of science we focus more
on the relations between relevant concepts and the progression
of argument than on experimental or implementation details. In
many cases we will slightly generalize domain specific terms, con-
cepts, and results to make them more consistent with each other.
Our inductive approach to science was only possible because of
the many deep and precisely formulated insights by researchers
from very different traditions, which strengthens our belief that
the true value of scientific insights can only be estimated outside
of the domain where it was developed. We present many of these
insights as direct quotes so that the quality of the formulation can
also be appreciated in a quite different context than the original
publication.
Our paper has, apart from the introduction, 4 main sections.
In section Open-Ended Development we address a wide range of
results and insights consistent with the title of our paper, suggest-
ing that open-ended development occurs in two or three steps,
with the third step being pre-conditioned on the success of the
second. In step one the agent’s focus is on making the body into
a reliable instrument. The second step involves making the mind
into a reliable and effective tool. Only success in this step allows
a third phase in which the agent learns to shape—co-create—the
conditions for its continued existence and in doing so it becomes
independent of external authority and truly autonomous. We
visualize this two or three step approach as a spiral development
in which matching development phases stemming from diverse
fields of research have been indicated. This spiral epitomizes
open-ended development.
In the next section we address two attitudes toward a com-
plex world. One associated with exploration and the other with
control. We couple these attitudes to two modes of being and
understanding of the world that comply very well with the differ-
ent strengths of the left (control) and right (exploration) hemi-
sphere. Here we conclude that step one and three rely on right
hemispheric dominance and step two on left hemispheric domi-
nance. We couple this conclusion to a need of external authority
associated with a dominant left hemisphere.
In sectionMotivations we addressmotivations by first focusing
on some of our own results that couple four qualitatively different
appraisals of the (sonic) environment to motivational states in the
context of core affect. We argue that each of the four quadrants of
core affect constrains mind-states in a distinct way and that moti-
vation can be treated as attitudes toward particularly appraised
worlds. We end this section with a table describing these four
quadrants in terms of motivation and other properties derived
from different scientific domains.
In section Open-Ended Development Driven by Intrinsic
Motivation we address the call topic “open-end development
driven by intrinsic motivations” by outlining the conditions
required for open-ended development, which, we argue, rely
essentially on the agent learning to shape its own environment.
We argue that the results of motivation research, interpreted in
the context of the four quadrants, describe what we call the “open-
ended development loop.” We note a number of observations and
constraints to be satisfied for open-end development to occur that
might be used to formulate a research agenda for artificial cogni-
tive systems research. We end with the observation that particular
Western—left hemispheric—biases have limited our understand-
ing of cognitive systems and we suggest a way to address these
limitations.
OPEN-ENDED DEVELOPMENT
Open-ended development is not undirected, quite the contrary.
The research outlined below shows that open-ended development
refers to the capacity to ever-extend and fine-tune one’s capacity
to deal with life’s challenges and to co-create one’s environment.
Put differently: open-ended development is a development that
allows agents to gradually master more and more of the com-
plexity of the world and to become more and more self-deciding,
agentic, and autonomous. Figure 1 visualizes open-ended devel-
opment and it summarizes many of the results that we address in
this section in terms of reported stadia of open-ended develop-
ment. While this section addresses the many properties of open-
ended development, its main drivers—the demands of an open
world, (intrinsic) motivation, and the open-ended development
loop—will be addressed in later sections.
The spiral development outwards makes about three turns that
reflect, very roughly, three developmental phases. The first phase
is physical growth and learning to control the body. In the second
phase one aims to makes the mind into a reliable instrument. The
third phase, preconditioned on the success of phase 2, concerns
learning to co-construct a world in which the inherent dynamics
of the world are stabilized and made reliable and broadly benefi-
cial. This leads to ever more extended (both in place and in time)
environments in which one can self-maintain the condition for
adequate functioning, leading to increasing diversity and individ-
ual authority. This characterizes the outer (pre-conditioned) loop
of the spiral development in Figure 1.
The figure has a number of functional components. The spi-
ral is divided into a number of sectors that reflect aspects of
open-ended development without being necessarily in the strict
circular progression the spiral form suggests. The end-state of the
spiral is referred to as self-actualization or wisdom. The solid-
line part of the spiral reflects development up the level of the
authoritarian personality, while the dashed part reflects an—in
Western cultures non-standard—additional development toward
the libertarian personality type. The main axes reflect behavior
types and strategies horizontally and self-development and action
readiness vertically. The diagonal axes reflect distinct develop-
ment stages from diverse scientific fields: moral development,
education research and epistemological development, and brain
lateralization research. In the next subsections we’ll provide sup-
portive evidence for each axis and gradually develop the key
terminology of this paper.
END-STATE: SELF-ACTUALIZATION ANDWISDOM
Open-ended development in humans is a highly structured pro-
cess that has been well studied in a variety of different domains
that each shed more light on the phases in the development
process. The development process begins obviously at concep-
tion and develops after birth in a number of stages toward
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FIGURE 1 | Open-ended development. This spiral development depicts
phases in open-ended development and terms typically associated with
different development phases. The inner rotation can be described as
learning to master the body, the second rotation as making the mind a
reliable tool and the third learning to effectively co-create an optimal living
environment. We propose that this corresponds to a progression from right
to left to right hemispheric dominance and associated strategies. [Inspired by
the depiction in Arnold, (1910), p. 23].
what Maslow (1943, 1962) calls self-actualization. According to
Maslow, self-actualization accounts for the highest possible forms
of psychological health and self-development. As such it is a
candidate for fully developed open-ended learning. Among the
main characteristic properties of a self-actualized individual are
(1) realistic perceptions of themselves, others, and the world
around them, (2) a strong motivation, through a sense of per-
sonal responsibility and ethics, to help others and to find solutions
to problems in the external world, and (3) a well-developed per-
sonal autonomy, which is for example visible as an utter disregard
of conformity if the situation demands this and an appreciation
for private time to self-develop one’s potential further.
Compared to not (yet) self-actualized individuals they
1. Have learned the skills to prevent or overcome one’s own psy-
chological problems that allow them to be rarely motivated by
unfulfilled needs,
2. Have developed a deep and pervasive understanding of reality
that they keep extending through life and that is apparent from
a well-developed creative capacity to produce intended results
with minimal adverse side-effects, and
3. Feel a moral obligation to contribute to an improved world.
These properties reflect deep realities concerning the nature of
agentic life. Interestingly the term self-actualization arose from
Maslow’s work on motivation (Maslow, 1943), but he refined
and defined the term self-actualization later on the basis of case-
studies of individuals of whom he thought that they represented
examples of self-actualization (Maslow, 1962). This intuition-
driven (dangerously circular) process is vindicated by results later
in this paper that dovetail with Maslow’s conclusions while being
based on entirely different evidence.
Another way to approach open-ended development comes
from gerontology and especially the role of lifelong learning and
continued education for older people which allows them to stay
involved in a rapidly changing world (Ardelt, 2000). This led to
a distinction between intellectual knowledge and wisdom-related
knowledge, of which the wisdom related knowledge develops
on a basis of intellectual knowledge. Wisdom-related knowledge
inductively reduces the quantity and complexity of intellectual
knowledge in favor of what is deeper and more essential. Wisdom
researcher Sternberg defines wisdom as follows:
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“the application of tacit knowledge towards the application of a
common good through a balance among intra-, inter-, and extra-
personal interests to achieve a balance among adaptation to existing
environments, shaping of existing environments, and a selection of
new environments, over the long term as well as the short term.”
(Sternberg, 1998)
One might summarize wisdom as “the ability to produce broadly
beneficial intended results while taking the full consequences of
behavior into account.” Again we find a combination of skill
(tacit knowledge), and (implicitly) a pervasive (long term) under-
standing of reality, in combination with an urge to improve and
shape the living environment. We consider this developing urge
to improve and shape living environments an essential aspect of
open-ended development and propose an explanation for that
below in the section on a complex world.
AUTHORITARIANS AND LIBERTARIANS
The solid part of the spiral is the development up to the level of
the authoritarian personality as defined by Stenner (2005, 2009).
Authoritarians “are not endeavoring to avoid complex thinking
so much as a complex world (Stenner, 2009, p. 193).” It is the
authoritarian’s underdeveloped cognitive capacity that “reduces
one’s ability to deal with complexity.” This personality-type seeks,
appreciates, and even demands external authorities to maintain
the living conditions in which they can function adequately:
normalcy. For authoritarians “authorities” are the processes or
agents that they perceive as responsible for maintaining normalcy
(and with that their sense of adequacy). Authoritarians display
“bounded autonomy” because they exhibit autonomy only in
a suitably controlled environment. Authoritarians actively help
their authorities in a particular and highly characteristic way: by
reducing the perceived complexity of the environment; in par-
ticular through intolerance of diversity and by supporting some
perceived central authority (an agent or process) with the same
surmised aim.
The dashed part of the spiral progresses beyond this level to the
libertarian personality (Stenner, 2005). Libertarians have gradu-
ally developed the autonomy and skills to co-create living condi-
tions in which they and others feel and act adequately without the
need for external authority to maintain and create these condi-
tions. Libertarians have internalized the role of authority and pre-
fer therefore individual authority to centralized authority. As such
libertarians become local centers of development and growth in
their (social) environment and consequently centers of diver-
sity. Compared to authoritarians who can function adequately
in standard situations and tend to exhibit norm-complying and
norm-returning behavior, libertarians (have learned to) under-
stand the world to a degree that they can cope effectively with
deviations from normalcy and they use the benefits this provides
to enhance their lives.
Stenner used a very simple “child-rearing values test” (Stenner,
2005) to determine whether individuals were authoritarian or lib-
ertarian (she only used the extremes in her analysis). Participants
that clearly preferred children to be raised as obedient conformist
were deemed authoritarian and those that preferred children to
be raised as independent self-deciders were deemed libertarian.
Apparently this simple six two-option test was enough to sepa-
rate people into a group that aims to avoid (a more) complex
world and a group that can comfortably deal with some more
complexity. Stenner specifically identifies the reaction to “nor-
mative threads,” perceptions of leadership failure and diversity
in public opinion, as key difference between authoritarians and
libertarians.
Authoritarian behavior depends on whether or not the situ-
ation might develop beyond coping capacity. This entails that
“individuals with a certain level of authoritarianism may man-
ifest entirely different attitudes and behaviors from one occasion
to the next, depending upon the presence or absence of normative
threat (Stenner, 2009, p. 189).” And “normative threat only invites
this kind of fear, cognitive unraveling and out-bursts of intolerance
among authoritarians, whereas in fact these very same conditions
(i.e., the public dissension and criticism of leaders that are the
hallmarks of a healthy democracy) induce only greater tranquility,
sharper cognition, and more vigilant defense of tolerance among lib-
ertarians (Stenner, 2009, p. 193).” We will use this observation in
the next section to differentiate between Two Attitudes Toward a
Complex World.
MAIN AXES
The axis from the center leftward in Figure 1 reflects increasingly
more advanced responses to environmental challenges develop-
ing from innate (e.g., sucking), via emotional (e.g., happy or
frustrated), to appropriate (e.g., culturally sanctioned) and even
proactive responses (e.g., preventing future problems or creating a
better society). Protruding downward is an axis denoting auton-
omy development. This axis develops from no autonomy at all,
via the bounded autonomy of authoritarians, to the autonomy of
libertarians. Extending rightward is an axis reflecting strategies
developing from voluntary movements and direct perception-
action relations, via coping strategies for the here and now, to
advanced co-creating strategies that define and shape the envi-
ronment (i.e., the agent as authority).
The axis extending from the center upwards reflects a devel-
opment from a dependent self, to an immature and mature self.
This development of the self has two separate but related facets:
social and personal maturity. “Social maturity is defined by mea-
sures of adaptation such as life satisfaction, environmental mastery,
or positive social relations. Personal maturity, however, is indexed
by openness to experience and indicators of personal wisdom such
as personal growth and ego development (Staudinger and Glück,
2011, p. 213).” Development of the self moves people increas-
ingly away from egocentric, dependent, and self-centered modes
of being (in Figure 1 referred to as “immature self”), toward the
capacity to take perspectives on the self and others, and to expe-
rience positive, helpful, responsible, and mutual interaction with
others referred to as “mature self” (Richardson and Pasupathi,
2005, p. 145).
DIAGONAL AXES
The lower left diagonal in Figure 1 simply reflects the develop-
ment from a baby, which is preoccupied with discovering its
body and its immediate environment, to childhood in which it
is preoccupied with the exploration of the neighborhood and the
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acquisition of habits, skills, and knowledge, and to adulthood in
which one’s potential can be developed and utilized in full.
The upper left diagonal shows the three main stages of moral
development as described by Kohlberg (1971). Kohlberg calls the
first main stage “pre-conventional” in which the child only under-
stands the consequences of its behavior in terms of direct effects on
self in terms of (un)pleasantness and in which it knows that obe-
dience is a way to avoid punishment. At this stage right action
concerns mainly the satisfaction of one’s needs. In the second,
“conventional,” phase the individual’s attitude is not only one of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it. It actively maintains, supports, and justifies the order and identi-
fies with the persons or group involved in it. This phase corresponds
closely to the description of authoritarianism. The third stage
is called the “post-conventional,” “autonomous,” or “principled”
level. Individuals at this stage make a clear effort to define moral
values and principles that have validity and application apart from
the authority of the groups of persons holding them and apart from
the individual’s own identification with the group (Kohlberg, 1975).
This stage corresponds closely to the description of libertarians.
A 20-year longitudinal study in Chicago found moral judgment
development to be positively correlated with age, socio-economic
status, IQ, and education. In addition development in child-
hood predicted development in adulthood. At age 36 only about
10% had reached a moral development at post-conventional level
(Colby et al., 1983); this suggests indeed that it is more an option
than a default in modern Western cultures.
The upper right diagonal reflects words from the field of epis-
temological development [see van Rossum and Hamer (2010) for
an overview] and in particular from Kuhn et al. (2000) who sep-
arates four levels of beliefs about the world. In the first “realist”
level, assertions exist only in direct reference to a state of the
world. In the second “absolutist” level assertions are authority
derived true or false representations of the world. In the third level
assertions are opinions that can be freely chosen, are accountable
to their owners, and that, apart from authority support, can-
not be ranked in terms of quality. In the fourth level assertions
are judgments that can be evaluated and compared according to
criteria of argument and evidence. This fourth level has passed
what van Rossum and Hamer (2010), p. 26 call the water-
shed between reasoning in terms of ready-made things (facts,
procedures) existing “out there” to independently constructing
meaning. Since this is, again, a transition between dependence
and independence of authority we associate (but not equate)
the “watershed” with the transition from authoritarianism to
libertarianism.
The last diagonal, in the lower right, describes typical activities
associated with different life-phases. A baby is typically involved
in all forms of sensory-motor explorations in which it gradually
learns to separate the whole of perceptual and motor experi-
ences into meaningful units. This parts-from-whole approach
of participatory discovery is typically associated with the right
brain hemisphere (McGilchrist, 2010). The second phase is typ-
ically culturally, technically, and representationally driven. In
this phase the main sources of knowledge are represented and
conveyed via languages (of diverse forms) and technologically
and culturally constructed objects and environments. This is a
phase in which—in our Western cultures—the left hemisphere is
dominant. It is also a world in which knowledge and skills are con-
structed from parts-to-whole. Knowledge and skills are typically
not self-discovered but directly derived from others (authorities).
In the post-watershed phase the participatory co-creation that
characterizes self-actualized individuals takes again the effect of
behavior in an ever-extending context into account. This suggests
a return to right hemispheric dominance. The processes that drive
these developments, and the rational to assign them to dominant
hemispheres will be addressed in the next section.
The next section addresses two essentially distinct modes of
being that are believed to underlie both hemispheric differences
as well as the key properties of intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tions that, we claim, differ in the way they approach a complex
situation.
TWO ATTITUDES TOWARD A COMPLEX WORLD
Complexity research has shown (Kauffman, 1995; Capra, 1997)
that all life and therefore all human activity seems to occur in
the transition region between order and disorder or structure and
chaos (Mora and Bialek, 2011). Too much structure precludes
diversity and development. Too much disorder precludes stability
and predictability. Put differently: moderately increasing disorder
allows for more diversity and development but allows less con-
trol. In moderation, disorder may lead to novelty, in excess it
leads to chaos. In contrast, increasing order fosters uniformity,
predictability, and control, but in excess it leads to stagnation
and lifelessness. Note that the moment a novel structure has
been discovered in a previously disordered or chaotic state, some
order (and meaning) is imposed on it and the complex system
becomes a little more tractable and accessible to agent influence.
With this discovery the “edge of chaos” has been pushed toward
higher complexity. We propose that this process pushes develop-
ment along the spiral in accordance with Vygotsky (1978) zone of
proximal development.
TWOMODES OF COGNITION
We can call the form of cognition that allows us to discover novel
structure “cognition for disorder,” “cognition for possibilities,” or
“explorative cognition.”Whatever it is called, its essential nature is
participatory: structures in (apparent) chaos are only discovered
through some form of participation in the system. During explo-
ration and play, the properties of these structures are revealed
and the structures of interest become gradually more familiar
and predictable. This allows their properties to be generalized,
abstracted, and integrated with existing knowledge and in doing
so made useful for in the widest possible range of environments
and (individual) challenges.
In situations where errors are costly (or even deadly) we need
a complementary form of cognition: a form that more aptly is
called “cognition for order,” “cognition for certainty,” or “con-
trol cognition.” Both are essential forms of cognition and together
they allow for a gradual proven and reliable extension of the limits
of agent capability toward ever more complex situations and ever-
larger temporal and spatial scopes. This continual progression of
exploration, consolidation, and testing is another formulation of
open-ended development.
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Recall that the reaction to an increasing complex world is the
key difference between authoritarians and libertarians (Stenner,
2009). This suggests that the complexity of our (living) world is
a deciding factor in determining whether someone is (or behaves
as) authoritarian or libertarian. Authoritarians tend to abhor a
complex world and feel an urge to reduce its complexity, while
libertarians can deal comfortably with some additional complex-
ity. The authoritarian reaction to increased complexity is with
fear and intolerance of diversity (reducing complexity), while the
libertarian reacts with increased interest and sharper cognition
(mastering complexity). This suggests that explorative cognition
and control cognition, in particular with authoritarians, are acti-
vated depending on whether the environment is appraised as safe
or unsafe.
The depiction in Figure 2 visualizes these two cogni-
tive responses. The backdrop is Escher’s, 1955 tessellation
“Liberation” that reflects a progression from lifeless, predictive
structure toward living free dynamics and endless possibilities.
Here we assume that an agent’s coping capacity allows it to deal
with some intermediate level of complexity half way this progres-
sion. Depending on whether the overall situation is perceived as
safe or unsafe, an agent might be motivated to explore dynamic
diversity and novelty—the interest bias—or be motivated to
reduce the complexity of the environment by helping to reduce
the complexity through curtailing diversity and dynamics—the
fear bias. The higher the life-fraction spent with an interest bias,
the more one explored and the more one learned to master
complexity.
It is therefore not surprising that the personality trait
“openness to experience” correlates positively with libertarianism
(Stenner, 2005). According to McCrae and Sutin (2009) “highly
open people are thus seen as imaginative, sensitive to art and
beauty, emotionally differentiated, behaviorally flexible, intellectu-
ally curious, and liberal in values. Closed people are down-to-earth,
uninterested in art, shallow in affect, set in their ways, lacking
curiosity, and traditional in values.” This contrast reads as a pref-
erence for an interesting vs. an ordered world. In addition “open
people admire openness, closed people despise it (McCrae and Sutin,
2009).” Associated with a closed attitude is “the need for closure”
(Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Malhotra et al., 2008), the desire
for definite and final answers. People prone to seizing on the first
idea offered and then freezing on this solution are in general unin-
terested in exploring alternative possibilities, keeping their views
simple and uncluttered.
TWO HEMISPHERES
The existence and detailed properties of these two forms
of cognition have recently been described in the seminal
work on the divided brain by McGilchrist[2010; see Rowson
and McGilchrist (2013) for a highly accessible introduction].
McGilchrist argues that the two cortical hemispheres under-
stand the world in quite different ways. In particular it sug-
gests to us that the left hemisphere specializes in cognition
for order, while the right hemisphere specializes in cogni-
tion for disorder. Table 1 provides a representative fraction
(McGilchrist, 2010 chapter 1) of the wealth of reported differences
FIGURE 2 | Dealing with complexity. The anxiety-free response to
increased complexity leads to curious exploration and sharper cognition,
while the anxiety-laden response activates intolerance of diversity. This
graphical depiction can be interpreted as agent development at some
part of the spiral in Figure 1 that gradually moves outwards toward
self-actualization. (M.C. Escher’s “Liberation” © 2013 The M.C. Escher
Company—the Netherlands. All rights reserved. Used by permission.
www.mcescher.com).
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Table 1 | Overview of roles and approaches ascribed to the left and right cortical hemisphere that together define two quite different stances
toward the world.
Topic
Left hemisphere
Cognition for: control, order, certainty
Right hemisphere
Cognition for: exploration, disorder, possibility
Main requirements
Associated with fear and anxiety, detachment,
abstract manipulation, closed to experience.
Associated with interest, participation, interaction, play,
openness to experience.
Closed vs. open personality Closed people are down-to-earth, uninterested in
art, shallow in affect, set in their ways, lacking
curiosity, and traditional in values. They are prone
to seizing the first idea offered and stick to it to
keep their views simple and uncluttered.
Openness to experience: imaginative, sensitive to art and
beauty, emotionally differentiated, behaviorally flexible,
intellectually curious, and liberal in values.
Main concern Principal concern is utility: the world as a resource. Prioritizes what actually is and what concerns us.
Scope Local short term view. Deal with what it knows. Bigger picture (broader, long-term view). Draws attention
from the edges of awareness.
Interests Interested in the familiar and the known, difficulty
with disengaging from the familiar. Concerned with
what it knows. Concerned with man-made objects.
Non-living objects specialist. Living entities as tools
or instruments. Body-parts. Tools and machines.
Interested in the novel. Concerned with what it
experiences. New information, new skills, emotional
engagement. More concerned with living individuals. Living
individuals as other individuals. Food + musical
instruments. Body as a whole.
Preferences Preferences for things that are represented as
relatively invariant across specific instances,
allowing for abstracted types or classes of things.
Preference for things that exist in the world. Sensitive to
what distinguished different instances of similar type from
each other.
Strengths Thoroughly known and familiar. Efficient in routine
situations and familiar skills. Prioritizes the
expected and generates expectations. Things
made fixed and equivalent: types. All that is
re-presented as over-familiar, inauthentic, lifeless
[because not individuated] categories.
Gathering new information. Good when prediction is
difficult. Anomaly (individuality) detector: individuals. More
efficiently when initial assumptions need to be revised or
when old information needs to be distinguished from new
information. All that is “present” as new, authentic, and
individuated.
Attention type Local narrowly selective (highly) focused attention. Broad, global, and flexible attention.
Attitude toward world Representing the world: the world as a copy that
exists in conceptual form, suitable for
manipulation.
Experiencing the world: the world as it is, open for novelty
and whatever exists apart from ourselves, without
preconceptions and not focusing on what it already knows.
Construction of world Start with pieces and put these together.
Bottom-up.
Start from the whole and go, if required, into detail.
Top-down.
Representation of objects Preference to re-present categories of things, and
generic, non-specific objects.
Individual unique instances of things and individual generic
objects: individuals are Gestalt wholes. Concerned with the
uniqueness and individuality of each existing thing or being.
Solution limitations Problem solving: single solution and latch on to
that. Deny inconsistencies. Suppressing not
currently relevant relations.
Array of possible solutions, which remain life when
alternatives are explored. Actively watching for
discrepancies.
Associations Single strong association more important that
multiple weaker associations.
Widespread activation of relations. Single strong or multiple
weaker relations equally important.
Preferred knowledge type Affinity with public knowledge. Personal knowledge.
Identification Identification by parts. Gradual (knowledge-based)
construction.
Identification from/by whole. “Aha!” phenomena through
seeking and finding patterns in things.
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Topic Left hemisphere
Cognition for: control, order, certainty
Right hemisphere
Cognition for: exploration, disorder, possibility
Reasoning Linear sequential arguments. More explicit
reasoning. Concentrating helps to focus on explicit
structure of the problem.
Deductions and some kinds of mathematical reasoning.
Pleasurable “Aha!” phenomenon mediates between
emotions and higher frontal cognitive functions. Insights
when NOT concentrating on a problem. Link with anomaly
(inconsistency detection in own assumptions).
Concentrating on problem impairs finding a solution.
Language use Language as symbol manipulation, More extensive
vocabulary, subtle and complex syntax. Parsing of
utterance, but meaning less deep. Explicit
meaning.
Interpretation as a whole and in context, attribution of full
meaning. Use of intonation and pragmatics. Non-literal and
implicit meaning. Sensitive to subtle unconscious
perception. Better at detection deceit.
View on world More optimistic view of the self and the world.
Also unwarranted optimism. More anger.
More associated with sadness than with angers. Sadness
associated to low activation of frontal lobe.
Main emotions Emotions associated with competition, rivalry,
individual-self-believe (positive and negative).
All emotions. Emotions related to bonding and empathy.
Empathy Unconcerned with others and their feelings. Empathic identification. Self-awareness, empathy,
identification with others. But only with what is known
[considered] to be another living being—not a mechanism.
Theory of mind.
Link with older parts of the
brain and body
More connected to the limbic system and the ancient
subcortical systems. Hypothalamic-pituitary axis, which is
where the endocrine interfaces with body and emotion.
Essential to the subjective appreciation of the body’s
physiological condition.
The description in the three header rows stems from the requirements of cognition for order and disorder. The header of the table summarizes cognition for order
and cognition for disorder. The body of the table contains near literal formulations from chapter 1 of McGilchrist (2010).
in how the individual hemispheres approach and understand the
world.
McGilchrist argues that in the last two or three millennia, our
Western societies have become characterized by an ever grow-
ing dominance of the left-hemispheric world view that favors a
narrow focus over the broader picture, specialists over general-
ists, fragmentation over unification, knowledge and intelligence
over experience and wisdom, technical objects over living enti-
ties, control over growth and flourishing, and dependence over
autonomy. In his book, called The Master and His Emissary
McGilchrist argues that the right hemisphere, with its holistic per-
spective and more intimate relation with the body is the master
that tasks its emissary, the left-hemisphere, with focused assign-
ments. However, in our increasingly culturally defined (i.e., more
technically structured and less naturally organized) world, where
linguistically transmitted shared knowledge has become more
important than individually acquired tacit knowledge, left hemi-
spheric strengths seem to have become more beneficial for most
of us than right hemispheric strengths.
IN- AND EXTERNAL AUTHORITY
However, and this is essential for our discourse, the left and right
hemisphere require quite different conditions to function opti-
mally. The right hemisphere assumes autonomous participation
in an open, dynamic, and infinite world of nested dynamical
systems that form dynamically stable and continually evolving
entities. In this mode of being, truth is defined as accordance
with reality and is to be tested by acting out in the world; right-
hemispheric knowledge and experiences are essentially subjective.
As such this mode of being is particularly effective in situa-
tions where new aspects of the dynamics of the world are to be
investigated to expand the thought-action repertoire (Fredrickson
and Branigan, 2005) and where novel and creative solutions are
appropriate.
In contrast, the left hemisphere assumes a closed, static, and
finite world in which entities are symbolic, discrete and abstract
and in which one is an “objective” observer instead of a partici-
pant. In this mode of being, truth is defined as the result of con-
sistent reasoning and consensually agreed on linguistically shared
and presented facts. This mode of being is particularly effective
in situations in which problems have to be solved or addressed
in a detached, rational, standardized, and communicable way.
Scientific communication is a typical example of this. Because
of this more narrow focus, left hemispheric strategies essentially
depend on processes that create andmaintain the required closed,
static, and finite world: the normative order introduced earlier.
We argue that authorities—defined as processes or agents that
create, maintain, and influence the conditions in which agents
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exist—fulfill this role. Adequate left hemispheric strategies, we
propose, are only possible if either an internal authority, i.e., the
right hemisphere, or external authorities ensure that conditions
are maintained in which left hemispheric strategies are effective.
In particular we propose that the authoritarian mode of being
corresponds to a left hemispheric dominance in combination
with a need for external authorities to create and maintain the
conditions in which a dominant left hemisphere can function
adequately. Libertarianism corresponds to a right hemispheric
dominance that is able to provide the proper conditions for
left hemispheric functioning. This entails that the authoritarian
agent, as the name suggests, is essentially dependent on external
authorities, while the libertarian agent, again as the name sug-
gests, is free from external authorities because the agent is able
to self-maintain the conditions in which both modes of cog-
nition contribute adequately. To put it bluntly, we argue that
authoritarianism in adults is a sign of arrested development that
limits individual autonomy growth to environments maintained
by external authorities.
AUTONOMY IN TWO OR THREE STEPS
In terms of Figure 1, this can be described as an initial right hemi-
sphere dominated inner-loop in which one learns to master the
body through playful interaction with the world. The second loop
is left hemisphere controlled because one learns from external
authorities and through abstracted linguistically conveyed knowl-
edge about the structures of the world. However the purpose of
this phase is to learn how tomake themind a useful instrument. If
this process succeeds, it allows one to effectively produce intended
results in both culturally defined and natural worlds. As such it is
a basis for confidence, further exploration, and gradually increas-
ing autonomy through the ability to co-create ever more extended
(both in place and in time) environments in which one can self-
maintain the condition for adequate functioning. This describes
the third (pre-conditioned) loop.
However, when an agent is unable tomake themind into a reli-
able instrument, the individual is frequently confronted with the
inability to produce intended results. And because the left hemi-
sphere is dominant in this phase, one responds in the complexity
reducing control mode favored by authoritarians. It is interesting
that “power” is defined as “the ability to produce intended results
(Russell, 1938).” Earlier we summarized Sternberg’s definition
of wisdom (Sternberg, 1998) as “the ability to produce broadly
beneficial intended results while taking the full consequences of
behavior into account.” This suggests defining raw power as “the
ability to produce intended results without necessarily taking the
full consequences of behavior into account.” Its is therefore not at
all surprising that typical centralized authoritarian organizations
such as bureaucracies, governments, large corporations, and the
military are always associated with “power” and standardization.
Libertarians do not need the control over the environment
provided by these centralist structures and they are, because they
made their mind into a reliable tool, not obsessed with reach-
ing intended results (they can do that more often than not). In
contrast they are more interested in understanding the full con-
sequences of behavior. This requires a participatory approach in
which one learns to discover and predict the innate dynamics of
the social, cultural, and natural world without necessarily con-
trolling or curtailing its diversity. On the contrary, working with
the inherent dynamics of the world is a way to stabilize it (or not
to disturb it). We refer to this creative process of moving with
the dynamics of the social and natural world as “co-creation”: a
product of open-ended development.
In the next section we will argue that external drivers of
behavior (functioning as external authority) are associated with
extrinsic motivation and left hemispheric strengths, while inter-
nal drivers of behavior are associated with intrinsic motivation
and as such with learning to co-create and open-ended develop-
ment. We will use the appraisal of the environment as the link
between open-ended development, the two attitudes toward the
world, and motivation.
MOTIVATIONS
To be motivated means to be moved to do something (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). However it is not yet clear how states of the world
or states of the individual motivate agents to spend their (mind)
time in particular ways. We will therefore start this section with
some recent results from soundscape research that helped us to
formalize the influence of the environment on motivation.
APPRAISAL, MOTIVATION, AND CORE AFFECT
A soundscape is a perceived sonic environment and soundscape
research addresses the role of sounds and sonic environments
on individuals and society. In a recent paper (Andringa and
Lanser, 2013), addressing how quiet sounds promote and annoy-
ing sounds impede health, we analyzed the words people use to
appraise sonic environments (Axelsson et al., 2010). Appraisals
are “cognitive evaluations of events that are considered to be the
proximal psychological determinants of emotional experience, with
different combinations of appraisals corresponding to different emo-
tions” (Kuppens et al., 2012). Appraisals typically refer directly or
indirectly to motivation. Kuppens et al. lists: motivational rele-
vance (“Is it important?”); motivational congruence (“Is it advan-
tageous or disadvantageous?”); agency (“Is it caused by others or
myself?”); problem and emotion focused coping potential (“Can I
cope with the situation and with my emotions?”); future expectancy
(“Is the expected outcome desired or not?”). Appraising the envi-
ronment therefore combines motivation, coping capacity, and
expectations of the future. As such the appraisal process involves
the evaluation of possible (inter)actions with the environment.
Appraisals are also connected to a central concept in emo-
tion theory called “core affect” (Russell, 2003). Core affect is
defined as an integral blend of the dimensions displeasure-
pleasure (valence) and passive-active (arousal). Unlike emotional
episodes, which are relatively infrequent, core affect is contin-
ually present to self-report. Core affect is usually visualized as
a circle with the pleasure axis horizontally and the arousal axis
vertically as depicted in Figure 3. Here relaxed and invigorated
moods are situated in the lower and upper right quadrants and
moods like boredom and anxiousness in the lower and upper left
quadrants respectively. Associated with these moods are calm and
lively appraisals on the right and a chaotic and boring appraisals
on the left (Andringa, 2013). Appraisals and core affect mutually
influence each other (Kuppens et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 3 | Core affect, appraisal, and four affective states estimated
from soundscape research (Andringa, 2013). The main axes reflect the
dimensions of core affect, the descriptions in the corners reflect typical
appraisals, the description in the circle quadrants reflect four affective states
and the diagonal axes represent an alternative way to span the circle in terms
of complexity of behavioral selection and affordance content.
AFFORDANCES AND COMPLEXITY
Since appraisals involve the evaluation of possible interactions
with the environment, they pertain to two main questions: what
action opportunities does the environment afford and: how to
decide on the best course of action? We will refer to the first ques-
tion as the affordance content, in Figure 3 as the diagonal from
lower left to upper right, and to the second as the complexity of
the environment. We will address these issues in order. Because
the description of the visual scene leads to quite similar patterns
of descriptive words (Russell et al., 1981; Axelsson et al., 2010) we
treat our results as if they pertain to perception in general.
Affordances are perceivable action possibilities, provided by
an environment (Chemero, 2003) that might be used to satisfy
(immediate or future) needs. Affordances arise thus from the
interaction of the environment with the perception capabilities of
the individual agent. Interesting environments provide discover-
able affordances to extend knowledge and skills through, typically,
playful interaction (Fredrickson, 1998). Boring environments are
devoid of discoverable affordances and do not provide appreci-
ated novelty (e.g., because they are devoid of stimuli, or the stim-
uli are either too static to be useful or too complex to interpret).
The more one interacts (plays) with interesting environments the
more complex affordances one learns to perceive.
The complexity of an environment is, in this context, a refer-
ence to how difficult it is to cope with environmental challenges
and opportunities. Complexity therefore refers not to the envi-
ronment per se, but to the question of how difficult it is for an
agent to decide on situationally appropriate behavior. Low com-
plexity environments are highly redundant (each part “predicts”
the whole, leading to an impression of harmony), which entails
that most perceptual evaluations of the environment lead to a
similar overall interpretation of pervasive safety. In “calm” low
complexity environments action outcomes are relatively insensi-
tive to the details of action selection and action execution; one
is neither forced nor enticed to act overtly and the mind is free
to wander and to attend its own business (Andringa and Lanser,
2013).
In contrast, highly complex environments are less redundant;
for example because of a lack of internal coherence due to a mul-
titude of uncorrelated processes, giving an impression of chaos
and unpredictability. This entails that the focus of attention needs
to be chosen and adapted well to ensure a proper selection and
execution of coping behavior. In contrast to low complexity envi-
ronments, complex situations may force one to act in a highly
controlled fashion and in response to particular events. This
entails that action outcomes in complex environments are highly
sensitive to detail.
This analysis suggests four qualitatively different types of
(sonic) environments in terms of the complexity of action selec-
tion and affordance content. The complexity depends on the
agent’s ability to select a safe course of action. Highly complex
or chaotic environments are difficult to interpret (e.g., due to an
overabundance of diverse stimuli), actively indicative of insecu-
rity, or in other ways requiring a precise selection of activities.
This type of environment activates highly focused mind-states
aimed at coping with the here and now. A boring (sonic) envi-
ronment is low on useful (audible) affordances and is, for that
reason, not indicative of safety, which activates alert mind-states.
In contrast, a lively environment is not indicative of insecurity
and represents many affordances that provide ample interesting
opportunities to attend, and it allows one freedom to address
the available affordances at will. The fourth environment is calm
or relaxing because it provides ample indications of safety and
allows as such full freedom of mind-states to relax and recu-
perate. Figure 3 provides these four domains of environmental
appraisal.
In terms of the spiraling open-ended development depicted
in Figure 1, the growing ability to detect and effectively use
affordances is a measure of progress along the spiral. Initially
the affordance content is predominantly used to determine sit-
uationally appropriate conformist behavior, but gradually the
affordances can be used in the more individualized and situation-
ally appropriate fashion characteristic of co-creation. Similarly,
any growth of the agents coping ability in Figure 2 depends on
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an increasing ability to perceive more and more complex affor-
dances and to learn more and more generic and reliable coping
strategies.
MOTIVATION AND REWARD SIGNALS
According to Baldassarre’s (2011) recent paper, motivations are
based on mechanisms that “drive learning of skills and knowl-
edge, and the exploitation and energisation of behaviors.” But
extrinsic motivations do this “on the basis of the levels and vari-
ations of homeostatic needs detected within the visceral body,”
while intrinsic motivations “facilitate this, on the basis of the
levels and the variations of such skills and knowledge directly
detected within the brain.” This suggests that, according to
Baldassarre, motivations are exclusively based on information
derived from either the body or the brain: appraisal of the
environment plays no (explicit) role. In addition, skills and
knowledge derived from extrinsic motivations “have the adap-
tive function to produce behaviours that allow the regulation of
those homeostatic needs so as to increase fitness.” In contrast
“intrinsic motivations have the adaptive function to allow organ-
isms to learn skills and knowledge without the necessity to have a
direct impact on homeostatic needs and fitness at the time of the
acquisition. These skills and knowledge contribute to increase fit-
ness as they can later be used to learn, relatively quickly, complex
behaviours and long chains of actions that regulate homeostatic
needs.”
Strictly interpreted this entails that extrinsically motivated
behavior only occurs after the visceral body develops a homeo-
static need, while intrinsically motivated behavior has no direct
benefit. Consequently a well-fed agent on the track of an
approaching train might be fascinated by the complex behav-
iors and long chains of actions afforded by this experience, but
it will not move unless it timely develops a visceral need such as
thirst. Yet apart from the absent role of situational appraisal there
is much to agree with in Baldassarre’s definition. In particularly
the role of the perceived needs of the visceral body—now or in
the foreseeable future—that define extrinsic motivations and its
reward function.
Ultimately, extrinsic motivations are deficiency motivations
and are associated with what Maslow referred to as D-cognition
(D = deficiency) which he defined as “the cognitions that are
organized from the point of view of basic needs or deficiency-needs
and their gratification and frustration {Maslow:1962tn, p. 189}.”
The reward signal of D-cognition is need-gratification: the plea-
sures of food after abstention, restoring order after chaos, relief
after a negotiating a dangerous situation, or a monetary reward
after boring work. Intrinsic motivations are uncoupled from
direct need gratification and allow what Maslow referred to as B-
cognition (B = being), a form of cognition in which the world
(or objects as Maslow referred to) as it objectively exists can
be discovered. These two forms of cognition again refer to the
two modes of being outlined in section Two Attitudes Toward
a Complex World. It is therefore to be expected that extrin-
sic motivations are predominantly left hemispheric phenomena,
that are driven by utility, while intrinsic motivations are more
right hemispheric phenomena associated with exploration and
open-ended-learning.
Baldassarre (2011) details how intrinsic motivations provide
the reward signals required to drive reinforcement learning.
According to him “intrinsic motivations are based on mechanisms
that measure the success of the acquisition of skills and knowl-
edge directly within the brain. For example, these mechanisms drive
organisms to continue to engage in a certain activity if their com-
petence in achieving some interesting outcomes is improving, or if
their capacity to predict, abstract, or recognise percepts is not yet
good or is improving: the brain detects all these conditions with-
out involving the visceral body.” The mechanisms that measure the
successful acquisition of new knowledge, skills, and insights are
essentially associated with open-ended development. The expe-
rience of this success has been described by Maslow (1954) as
a feature of B-cognition. Maslow describes peak experiences as
“feelings of limitless horizons opening up to the vision, the feeling
of being simultaneously more powerful and also more helpless than
one ever was before, the feeling of great ecstasy and wonder and awe,
the loss of placing in time and space with, finally, the conviction
that something extremely important and valuable had happened, so
that the subject is to some extent transformed and strengthened even
in daily life by such experiences.” According to Maslow the fur-
ther the development toward self-actualization the more frequent
these peak experiences occur, which suggests that they are expe-
rienced rewards signals that drive the later stages of open-ended
development in B-cognition.
MOTIVATION, AGENCY, AND MIND-STATES
Motivation researchers such as Ryan and Connell (Ryan and
Connell, 1989) couple motivations directly to the perceived locus
of causality (PLOC), which reflects the degree the individual or
some external authority or influence originates the behavior. It
is a measure of autonomy and agency. The more autonomous
the behavior, the more it is endorsed by the whole self and is
experienced as action for which one is responsible (Deci and
Ryan, 1987). This leads to a sequence of progressively more
agentic motivations: “external,” “introjected,” “identified,” and
“intrinsic” reasons to act. According to Ryan (Ryan and Connell,
1989) “external reasons were those where behavior is explained by
reference to external authority, fear of punishment, or rule com-
pliance.” Introjected reasons are framed in terms of “internal,
esteem-based pressures to act, such as avoidance of guilt and shame
or concerns about self and other-approval.” These are typically
situation-enforced motivations with the aim to prevent a worse
outcome associated with doing nothing. “Identifications were cap-
tured by reasons involving acting from one’s own values or goals, and
typically took the form of ‘I want’.” Through this identification the
locus of causality shifts more and more to the agent. Intrinsic rea-
sons for action occur whenever “the behavior is done ‘simply’ for
its inherent enjoyment or for fun.”
More recently (Malhotra et al., 2008) ordered motivations
in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that have an
external or internal perceived locus of causality, and exogenous
and endogenous motivation that reflect whether the behavior is
driven either by external stimuli or by internal needs or drives.
This resulted in four combinations of in-/extrinsic and exo-
/endogenous motivations that dovetails very well with the four
quadrants in Figure 3 (combining appraisal and core affect), the
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two modes of cognition in section Two Modes of Cognition,
and the role of the two hemispheres described in section Two
Hemispheres. As such this allows us to combine many concepts
addressed in this paper in a single framework, which is depicted
in Table 2.
The entries reflect descriptive words originating from different
authors. The upper row and leftmost column reflect descriptions
that pertain to the whole row or column respectively. The two
rightmost columns, titled extrinsic and intrinsic, reflect modes of
being that are directly associated with the two ways to approach
complexity, the role of the left and right hemisphere, Maslow’s
D- and B-cognition, the role of safety in environmental appraisal,
and the diverse descriptions of ex- and intrinsic motivations. The
two lower rows reflect whether behavior is exogenous and highly
activated or endogenous and less activated. The four remain-
ing cells reflect descriptions that pertain to each of the different
combination of in-/extrinsic and exo-/endogenous motivation.
They also refer to a more general interpretation of the quadrants
as depicted in Figure 3. These cells/quadrants have a descriptive
name in bold.
The control quadrant reflects a combination of external moti-
vating stimuli with the external perceived locus of causality char-
acteristic of a challenging world. This quadrant reflects a motiva-
tional state in which an agent primarily aims to avoid immediate
or future injury, harm, or disadvantage. Another name for this
quadrant would be the problem-solving quadrant. An agent in
this highly complex situation (in terms of behavior selection) is
interested in any utility instrumental to avoid negative conse-
quences and to retain or regain control. The associatedmind-state
is stably focused on the problem as long as the problem exists and
is a form of prolonged effortful directed attention (Kaplan, 1995).
The exploration quadrant combines external stimuli with an
internal PLOC leading to self-chosen overt behavior that is per-
ceived as fun and enjoyed for its own sake; all characteristic of
an interesting world. Aimless but definitely unforced exploration
and creation is only possible in apparent safety and requires envi-
ronmental affordances at a level of complexity that the agent can
handle without being taxed too much or too little. The associated
mind-state is flexibly focusing on the most interesting aspects of
the world, while remaining completely absorbed without lapses
and pauses. Flow (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2002) is a
fitting description for this pleasurable mind-state.
The consolidation quadrant combines individual-need-driven
activities with an internal PLOC. This is also only possible in a
safe world. This may or may not lead to overt behavior, but is
in all situations aimed at unforced self-development, growth, or
other forms of psychological and physical recuperation and devel-
opment. In this quadrant the associated mental activities are free
to digress or to wander aimlessly without purpose or goal. One
associated mind-state is fascination (Kaplan, 1995) which allows
a prolonged, uninterrupted, and effortless immersion in an envi-
ronment that is pleasant and self-selected to address personal
needs proactively. This does not involve directed attention and
therefore restores the capacity for directed attention. It is in this
mind-state that the mind/brain can address its own needs.
The last quadrant is described with the term submission (to
external forces), characteristic of a dominating world. This quad-
rant is characterized by an external locus of perceived causality
Table 2 | Four motivational states.
Motivations Extrinsic
Russell: unpleasant
Ryan: external PLOC, low autonomy
Maslow: D-cognition
McGilchrist: left-hemisphere
Baldasare: extrinsic, deficiency driven, direct fitness benefit
Andringa: no safety, reactive
Intrinsic
Russell: pleasant
Ryan: internal PLOC, higher autonomy
Maslow: B-cognition
McGilchrist: right-hemisphere
Baldasare: intrinsic, future fitness benefit
Andringa: safety, pro-active
Exogenous
Russell: highly activated
Malhotra: Driven by
external stimuli
Control
World: challenging
Ryan: introjected motivation (internal or esteem-based
pressures to avoid harm)
Malhotra: usefulness/utility
Andringa: retaining or regaining control
Andringa: high complexity
Mind-state: directed attention
Exploration
World: interesting
Ryan: intrinsic motivation, completely self-determined
activity
Malhotra: hedonistic (fun, enjoyment)
Andringa: learning and playing in safety
Andringa: high affordances
Mind-state: flow
Endogenous
Russell: minimally
activated
Malhotra: Driven by
internal needs/drives
Submission
World: dominating
Ryan: external (authority enforced, fear of punishment, rule
compliance)
Malhotra: guided (to external regulation)
Andringa: no sense of safety or control
Andringa: low affordances
Mind-state: boredom
Consolidation
World: safe
Ryan: identified (personal importances) or integrated
(personal goals)
Malhotra: self-development, self-enhancement, self-growth
Andringa: restoring resources and caring
Andringa: low complexity
Mind-state: fascination
This table combines results and concepts from many different domains and provides a generalization of the quadrants in Figure 3.
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in combination with unfulfilled internal needs that offer no other
options than to accept guidance, to be subjected to external con-
trol (through threat, punishment, or fear), or to do nothing due
to cognitive inadequacy given the current environment. In this
quadrant the mind is never at rest, but fruitlessly in search of
ways to cope. One associated mind-state is boredom, which is
described (Martin et al., 2006) as “Not being in control of life;
agitated, yet at the same time, lethargic.” In addition boredom is
associated with restlessness, stress, the feeling of being trapped,
frustration, fatigue, lack of concentration, guilt, meaninglessness,
and even depression.
The range of scientific domains that have contributed to
Table 2 is wide and includes emotion research (Russell, 2003),
motivation research (Ryan and Connell, 1989), human machine
interfacing (Malhotra et al., 2008), computational development
and learning (Baldassarre, 2011), soundscape research (Andringa
and Lanser, 2013), personal development (Maslow, 1962), cog-
nitive psychology (Kaplan, 1995), and general cognitive science
and culture studies (McGilchrist, 2010). This is an impressive
range that is suggestive of the fundamental nature of the topic
of this call on open-ended development driven by intrinsic
motivations.
OPEN-ENDED DEVELOPMENT DRIVEN BY INTRINSIC
MOTIVATION
This concluding section returns to the core topic of the call:
open-ended development driven by intrinsic motivation. We will
use the four motivational states as described in Table 2 to cou-
ple motivation to open-ended development via what we call the
“open-ended development loop.” We will first address motiva-
tion in terms of attitudes and strategies to deal with the world
as it is experienced. Secondly we will directly address the intimate
relation between open-ended development, intrinsic motivation,
and acting out in the world. Thirdly we will outline some conse-
quences for artificial cognitive system research and in particular
how to facilitate development toward truly autonomous and
moral agents. Finally, we will argue that the left hemispheric
biases characteristic of Western cultures have limited artificial
cognitive systems research and we suggest a solution to address
these limitations.
MOTIVATION, AUTHORITY, AND CO-CREATION
This subsection returns to the concepts “authority” and “co-
creation” that we introduced as essential for open-ended devel-
opment. We aim to demonstrate that they are important not only
as core concepts of cognitive science, but also as defining concepts
for agency and even as main forces that shape our (geo)political
world.
The section End-State: Self-Actualization and Wisdom, dis-
cussed the target of open-ended development and concluded that
the authoritarian personality type “seeks, appreciates, and even
demands external authorities to maintain the living conditions
(the normative order) in which they can function adequately.”
In Section In- and External Authority we proposed that the
need for external authority was a necessary consequence of left
hemispheric dominance that requires a closed, static, and finite
world to be effective. This entails that left hemispheric strategies
and external authority are mutually dependent: external author-
ities are expected to maintain the conditions in which the left
hemisphere functions adequately. Left hemispheric strategies—
through for example intolerance of diversity—reinforce the
impact of external authorities through actively allowing exter-
nal authorities more control while reducing one’s own agency.
Overall this mode of being reduces the complexity of the world
through increased uniformity and shared or centralized author-
ity: the defining characteristics of authoritarians (Stenner, 2005).
In moderation this process accounts for the existence of corpora-
tions, governments, organized religion, and the military. In excess
it leads to stultifying bureaucracies in each of these organizations
and eventually to oppressive dictatorship.
However, control through increased uniformity and central-
ized authority is neither the only nor the best way to deal
with a complex world. Section End-State: Self-Actualization and
Wisdom concluded that self-actualized or wise individuals feel
a moral obligation to contribute to an improved world and we
summarized wisdom as “the ability to produce broadly beneficial
intended results while taking the full consequences of behavior
into account.” Section Authoritarians and Libertarians concluded
that the libertarian personality developed the autonomy and skills
to co-create living conditions in which (s)he and others feel and
act adequately, without the need for external authority to main-
tain and create these. The driving dynamics for this ability is
rooted in the self-confidence resulting from the interest-based
exploration and playful behavior that prepared the agent well
for an unknown future (Silvia, 2008). In effect this leads to the
ability to co-create ever more extended (both in place and in
time) environments in which one can self-maintain the condi-
tion for adequate functioning, which leads to increasing diversity
and individual authority: the defining characteristics of libertari-
ans (Stenner, 2005). This advanced ability characterizes the outer
(pre-conditioned) loop of the spiral development in Figure 1.
The difference between the authoritarian and libertarianmode
of dealing with a complex world can be (Horney, 1945) summa-
rized as “moving against” or “moving with.” The (according to
Horney pathological) “moving against” mode controls diversity
and reduces complexity through actively suppressing the inherent
dynamics of the world. Note that this is the defining character-
istic of our psychology or robotics labs. The (non pathological)
“moving with” works with or co-opts the inherent dynamics of
the world to stabilize it or to prevent the disruption of reliable and
useful inherent dynamics. As such “moving with” is a summary of
right hemispheric strategies.
The “moving with” mode of being, characteristic of the wise
and the self-actualized, allows them not only to create and main-
tain an individual environment in which they can function ade-
quately, it allows them to co-create the wider environment by
gradually reducing the need for external authority (also in others)
by (re)allowing and shaping the inherent dynamics of the world
in favor of all its inhabitants.
Figure 4 provides a graphical depiction of much of the infor-
mation in Table 2, but it focuses on the relation between the agent
and the environment and the difference between external (con-
trolling) authority and internal (co-creating) authority. The large
ovals reflect the agent’s world that is more (light gray) or less (dark
www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 766 | 13
Andringa et al. Learning autonomy in two or three steps
FIGURE 4 | Motivation, authority, and co-creation. This figure
combines four qualitatively different types of environments in terms
of the complexity of action selection and affordance content. The
ovals around the agent (white circle) defines self-maintained
environments in which the agent can more or less satisfy its needs
(light vs. darker shade) and be agentic (size of circles). The dark
circle represents a source or novelty approached in danger (left) or
safety (right).
gray) congruent with agentic needs. The prominence of external
authorities (the inward pointing arrows) determines whether the
world is characterized by suppressed dynamics (the authoritarian
mode on the left) or co-opted dynamics (the libertarian mode on
the right). The more the agent is able to create and extend a stable
agent-maintained environment (dashed oval), the safer and more
authoritative it is.
Figure 4 provides the four motivational quadrants defined in
terms of the quadrants shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. In the
left quadrants the agent is either trying to control or is actu-
ally controlled by complex and ill-understood external forces
that function as authorities. In the upper left quadrant the agent
is challenged by environmental and/or agentic influences which
stretch its coping capacity, force it into a narrow range of coping
behaviors, and depletes its resources. In the lower left quadrant
the agent is part of a world that is mainly beyond its control
and understanding, since it does neither afford the agent useful
affordances nor resupply of resources. As such it has to accept a
minimally agentic role, for example by being forced to participate
in activities that may harm its future interests.
In the quadrants on the right the agent’s world is congru-
ent with its needs (the most prominent of these is safety). The
agent in the upper right quadrant is maximally agentic since it
is able to use and explore the affordances of its world in safety
and with satisfied basic needs. The agent exists in an interesting
world in which it is free to participate in co-creation strategies that
gradually elucidates and stabilizes more and more of the world’s
inherent dynamics for shared benefit. The agent in the lower
right quadrant exists in a safe, low complexity environment. It is
unforced since, in essence, it profits from earlier co-creation activ-
ities of itself and others. This state allows the agent to resupply its
resources (to address its needs) and to consolidate its experiences
into generalized knowledge and skills.
This then, we conjecture, defines the success of open-ended
development: successful open-ended development is character-
ized by a balance between the co-creation of a low complexity
world, in which behavior selection is easy, in combination with
high agency due to an abundance of affordances for maintained
and extended co-creation. It is this dynamic balance that living
agents find highly pleasurable. The enjoyment of successful agen-
tic life—happiness—is therefore deeplymeaningful: it is body and
mind agreeing on success. And it also suggests that strengths of
the right hemisphere, as listed in Table 1, might be understood as
pervasive optimization.
OPEN-ENDED DEVELOPMENT DRIVEN BY INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
In this subsection we will more directly address the intimate rela-
tion between open-ended development, intrinsic motivation, and
acting out in the world. In their review paper on extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations and their importance for education and
development, Ryan and Deci (2000) conclude that “social contex-
tual conditions that support one’s feelings of competence, autonomy,
and relatedness are the basis for one maintaining intrinsic motiva-
tion.” They define relatedness as the basic need to feel connected,
competence as the basic need to be effective, and autonomy as the
basic need to feel agentic. According to Ryan and Deci we need
these three basic human needs to be fulfilled in the classroom “as
one is exposed to new ideas and exercises new skills.”
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Interestingly, this conclusion can be connected one-to-one
with the quadrant structure of Figure 2, Table 2, and Figure 4. In
the exploration quadrant one expresses autonomy and agency and
extends one’s behavioral repertoire. In the consolidation quadrant
one develops—in the absence of environmental pressures—new
connections between oneself and the environment and one relates
and combines hitherto unrelated knowledge and experiences. In
doing so one generalizes, stabilizes, and consolidates knowledge
and relations (whether mental, social, or otherwise). The con-
solidated knowledge, (social) relations, and skills, no longer new
and unpredictable, become more and more suitable for gen-
eral utility and in particular problem solving (a left-hemispheric
activity). This corresponds to the problem-solving quadrant in
which the agent can prove its increased competence and test and
fine-tune its extended behavioral repertoire. Successful real-world
problem solving leads to confidence, which is a basis for fur-
ther exploration, consolidation, and testing. This “open-ended
development loop” is depicted in Figure 5.
The continuation of the open-ended development loop
depends crucially on the success-rate of the in the real-world
problem solving ability. Failure to come up with a suitable
solution leads to reduced confidence and eventually frustration.
Perkins and Hill (1985) provide strong support that boredom
is associated with frustration, and since the lower left quadrant
is associated with boredom, low agency, and the need for guid-
ance, it makes sense to situate persistent failure and the ensuing
low confidence and reduced urge to explore in this quadrant.
Persistent failure not only disrupts the open-ended development
loop, it is also a strong demotivation to engage in any agentic
activity and especially activities that are not habitual (because
habits are activated by the environment) and therefore rely on
some measure of agency.
This description is reminiscent of the phenomenon of learned
helplessness that was discovered when “dogs exposed to inescapable
and unavoidable electric shocks in one situation later failed to learn
to escape shock in a different situation where escape was possible
(Maier and Seligman, 1976).” Learned helplessness depends on
the uncontrollability of the aversive stimulus, which may entail
that the agent learns that its activities do no longer produce
intended outcomes. If so the agent does not unlearn its behav-
ior, it simply no longer activates it because of its expected futility.
Interestingly, in rats learned helplessness occurs only when one
crucial condition is satisfied: “the response used in the test for
learned helplessness must be difficult, and not something the rat does
very readily.” Which, indeed, suggests that learned helplessness
occurs only with activities that are agentic. This is the reason why
the lower left describes its effect as “deactivating behaviors.”
RELEVANCE TO COGNITIVE SYSTEM RESEARCH
We believe that for autonomy to arise in any meaningful way,
goal selection and achievement must occur in a (broad) tran-
sition region between order and disorder in which both danger
and opportunity and defined (conform Figure 2). Without access
to such a transition region and the experiences that it affords,
the flexible and opportunistic balance and the complementar-
ity between cognition for order en cognition for disorder cannot
develop, which entails that there is nothing to drive the open-
ended development loop in Figure 5.
Figure 5 suggests a principled way to formulate and structure
reward signals because each of the quadrants may be associated
with particular reward signals: the lower left with the gratitude
of being led or adoration of authority, the upper left with the joy
of restoring order, solving problems, or to receive social esteem
rewards, the lower right with the joy of insights and under-
standing and the joys of interpersonal relations (love, friendships,
and altruism), and finally the upper left the joy of play, explo-
ration, and creation. The varying states of the environment and
the associated appraisals (interesting, safe, or challenging) then
FIGURE 5 | Open-ended development loop. The words in brackets originate
from Ryan and Deci (2000). The loop depends essentially on the rewards
signals associated with exploration (experiencing novelty), consolidation
(discovering and fostering relations), and successful problem solving. The
reward signals associated with this loop, described as peak experiences
(Maslow, 1962), drive the outward spiraling development of Figure 1.
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bring one in different learning modes. A suitable artificial agent
that can engage in this open-ended development loop should be
able to learn its way from guided exploration, consolidation, and
problem solving into gradually more autonomous exploration,
consolidation, and problem solving. In theory, each agent can
learn to become autonomous and even wise (i.e., effectively co-
creative), as long as it exists in an open environment that offers
opportunities for all reward signals.
By constraining the learning environment it is possible to
define the character of this agent by ensuring that it is not suffi-
ciently exposed to all reward signals of the open-end development
loop. For example, by making it very difficult to continue open-
ended learning beyond a certain level of bounded autonomy, one
creates an agent who will predominantly experience the reward
signals associated with the pleasure of being “moved by.” This will
lead to an agent that seeks and loves its servitude.
Alternatively an agent that is “raised” in insecurity will be
exposed predominantly to the reward signals and learning out-
comes associated with “moving against” uncertainty (e.g., of
suppressing diversity), successful problem solving, protocol fol-
lowing, and other forms of cognition for order. This agent will
be a quite autonomous apparatchik, someone “not of grand plans,
but of a hundred carefully executed details (Billington, 1980),” who
has no inkling of its role in the grander scheme of things, and
who will spontaneously and quite ruthlessly seek, accept, and sup-
port external authorities to maintain or restore the conditions for
its adequate functioning. Characteristically It will enforce global
uniformity and suppress local optimization whenever it increases
diversity.
The agent that has been raised in a safe and protected situation
and has primarily been exposed to the reward signals associated
with love, friendship, and understanding, will develop the many
facets of relatedness and profound interest in the world conform
the induction capacity of cognition for disorder. This empathic
agent will “move toward” others, be comfortable with diversity,
and quite able to perceive and understand the beauty and ills of
the world. However in times of adversity the empathic agent will
not be able to organize or restore and maintain order the way the
apparatchik can and it will probably be crushed by its imposed
order and intolerance to diversity.
Fourthly the explorative agent is always in search of the reward
signals associated with discovery, novelty, creation, and individual
expression. This might be an artist agent who seeks the most indi-
vidual expression of the most individual emotion, a risk-taker,
or an autarchic agent that prefers the solitude of self-sufficiency
to celebrate its individuality and autonomy. In Horney’s (1945)
terminology he is “moving away.”
It is interesting that Horney’s (1945) terminology—moving
away, moving toward, and moving against—fits so well on the
three quadrants that define the open-ended development loop.
Horney’s “moving with” personality, whomoves with the dynam-
ics of the world, is her only non-pathological personality. In our
framework this is the personality that has learned from all reward
signals and that as such has spend much time in the open-ended
development loop, with the associated peak experiences. This is
the only agent personality who has a proven competence (and
autonomy) for most of its existence.
INCLUDING THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE IN COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
RESEARCH
Gomila’s and Müller’s (2012) definition of an cognitive system as
“one that learns from individual experience and uses this knowledge
in a flexible manner to achieve its goals” dovetails with how we
defined raw power in section Autonomy in Two or Three Steps:
“the ability to produce intended results without necessarily taking
the full consequences of behavior into account.” In that sec-
tion we concluded that executing raw power is a typical left
hemispheric (authoritarian) response. A more developed liber-
tarian, and wiser, response takes the full consequences of behavior
into account. This suggests that the left hemispheric dominance
of Western societies that McGilchrist (2010) describes has also
limited the understanding of the artificial cognitive systems com-
munity by focusing its research on left hemispheric strongpoints
such as object manipulation, problem solving, and task execu-
tion. If so, these Western biases have prevented the artificial
cognitive systems community (and other scientific communi-
ties) from fully realizing the importance of right hemispheric
strengths.
It might therefore be useful to study cultures without these
Western limitations. For example Erica Fox Brindley, who stud-
ies the intellectual and cultural history of early China (500 BC
to 200 AD), wrote a book on individualism in early China [for a
summary see Brindley (2011)], which provides a rich description
of the roles of agency, autonomy, and authority as the right hemi-
sphere might understand these. She writes for example (Brindley,
2010 pp. xxvii–xxviii):
Earlier Chinese forms of individualism do not generally focus on
the radical autonomy of the individual, but rather on the holistic
integration of the empowered individual with forces and author-
ities in his or her surroundings (family, society, and cosmos). For
early Chinese thinkers, there is no such thing as unfettered auton-
omy or freedom of will, in line with Kantian notions of the self.
While such concepts are considered problematic even in some
Western traditions they nonetheless constitute a core strand of
thought that continues to inform contemporary concepts of indi-
vidualism. In contrast to such conceptualizations, there exists a
relative and relational sort of autonomy in early Chinese contexts,
a type of autonomy that grants individuals the freedom to make
decisions for themselves and to shape the course of their own lives
to the fullest degree that they can and should—all from within
a complicated and rich system of interrelationships. This type of
autonomy, in other words, grants authority to the individual to
fulfill his or her potential as an “integrated individual.” The goal
of such an individual is to achieve authoritativeness as a person
while at the same time conforming to certain types of authority
stemming from his or her larger environment.
. . . Yet the emphasis in the Chines tradition on the relative
autonomy of an individual from within a system of holis-
tic and interconnected processes is quite different from many
of the models with which we [Westerners] are most familiar.
Rather than view autonomy in relationship to a void (individu-
als as ex nihilo), individuals emerge authoritative and powerful
as part and parcel of an interconnected web of forces. Therefore,
a crucial back-and-forth tug between the self and the various
influences and authorities surrounding it is woven in the very
fabric of what it means to be a fully attained and empowered
individual.
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This description, while not even derived from a cognitive sci-
ence source, illustrates many of the key points of this paper. For
example, in terms of agent terminology it states that the goal of
a developing agent is to achieve authoritativeness (i.e., to inter-
nalize the role of authority) while at the same time conforming
to certain types of authority stemming from the larger environ-
ment. Since we defined authority as the “processes or agents that
create, maintain, and influence the conditions in which agents
exist,” this description describes the outward development along
the spiral in Figure 1. While all agents influence their living envi-
ronment, it is the more authoritative—libertarian—agent that
successfully can take a role as co-creator and co-maintainer of its
environment. So co-creation—defined as working with the inher-
ent dynamics of the world as opposed to frantically controlling
and curtailing it—was an inherent part of early Chinese philos-
ophy. In fact it corresponds to the Daoist key term “Wu wei,”
which “means something like ‘act naturally,’ ‘effortless action,’ or
‘nonwillful action’ (Littlejohn, 2003).” So the point of open-ended
development is to learn “Wu wei” through a process of the inter-
nalization of authority insofar achievable given natural laws as
highest authority.
The point to make here is not that early Chinese philoso-
phy is an alternative to Western approaches to artificial cog-
nitive systems research, but that our cultural biases limit our
understanding. Accounting for these biases and learning from
cultures without these particular (and probably other) biases
can help to inform the formulation of fundamental research
roadmaps such as for artificial cognitive systems. We propose that
putting the strengths of the right hemisphere (as summarized in
Table 1) center-stage is an essential step to take artificial cogni-
tive systems research out of the closed domain solutions afforded
by left hemispheric approaches (and caricatures) of cognitive
systems.
If the artificial cognitive systems community indeed tries to
rid itself from its limiting biases and adopts approaches that
puts the strengths of the right hemisphere and the open-ended
development loop central, we have a suggestion for a suit-
able environment for artificial cognitive system development.
This environment offers at the same time (1) many differ-
ent agents and processes to relate with and care for, (2) many
problems to solve and protocols to follow, and (3) an endless
and unstoppable variety of novelty and change. This environ-
ment might have been an essential progenitor of our cultures
because it approximates an ideal balance of reward signals to
drive open-ended learning. So a robot that acts responsibly
in this environment should be able to acquire the compe-
tences and moral development required to function responsibly
in the rest of our societies. For that reason we suggest that
robot labs should collaborate with . . . low-tech self-sustaining
farms where human, animals, vegetables, fruits, and grains flour-
ish in one of the finest examples of what co-creation can
offer.
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